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ABSTRACT
The issue of accountability in Indigenous affairs has recently received
national prominence. Accountability - usually meaning financial
accountability to government or to the wider public - is often seen as being
potentially inconsistent with Indigenous self-determination. This paper
broadly delineates a conceptual framework which links 'organisational self-
determination' with a notion of 'internal accountability', that is the
accountability of an organisation to its Indigenous members, clients or
constituency. It further argues that this internal accountability is also linked
to 'public accountability', that is the financial and other accountability of an
organisation to funding agencies and ultimately the wider public. While
there may be inherent tensions between public accountability and self-
determination, these policy goals can be linked through the development of
effective mechanisms for internal accountability.
The paper suggests that a focus on specific mechanisms by which internal
accountability of Indigenous organisations can be achieved and enhanced
can assist in the realisation of both self-determination and public
accountability, thus providing a way forward in what can often be a sterile
debate on whether to emphasise one policy goal at the necessary expense
of the other.
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Foreword
This discussion paper by Drs David Martin and Julie Finlayson synthesises
research material collected by them on a number of research projects and
consultancies over the past two years. Most specifically, some of the
conceptual framework concerning accountability has appeared in a brief
document prepared by the authors in their role as consultants engaged by
the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies
(AIATSIS) in a review of the Commonwealth Aboriginal Councils and
Associations Act 1976 undertaken during 1996 for the Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC).
A very general version of this discussion paper was presented as a seminar
'Aboriginal Associations: vehicles for service delivery or self
determination?' at the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research
(CAEPR) on 29 May 1996. Subsequently, both ATSIC and AIATSIS
requested, with some justification, that publication of an expanded written
version of the seminar be delayed until the AIATSIS review was
completed. In September 1996, the final review report was lodged,
somewhat later than expected, with ATSIC for consideration by the
review's Steering Committee and by the Board of Commissioners and the
Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs. Early in
September I wrote to ATSIC seeking permission to finally publish this
paper; ATSIC responded quickly that it saw no reason to delaypublication.
A few disclaimers are probably appropriate. First, while some of the
material in this discussion paper is based on the brief consultancy
undertaken by Drs Martin and Finlayson for AIATSIS, it largely draws on
research and field work undertaken by them before and after their
engagement by AIATSIS. Second, while some of the issues addressed in
this discussion paper are related to the review, it extends well beyond the
review's ambit. Finally, the views articulated in this discussion paper are
not necessarily linked in any way with those incorporated in the review's
final report. Indeed this discussion paper does not directly mention any
recommendations from the final report.
It is my view that in the current political and policy environment with
considerable attention being focused on the performance and accountability
of incorporated Indigenous organisations, this discussion paper has a
considerable public interest component. There is no doubt in my mind that
it will value-add considerably to an important debate.
Professor Jon Altman
Series Editor
October 1996
Introduction
The issue of accountability in Indigenous affairs has recently received
national prominence, including in the media.1 The ongoing debate about
the accountability of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission
(ATSIC), the investigations into various Aboriginal Legal Services, the
appointment by the Federal Minister of a Special Auditor to oversee
ATSIC grants to Indigenous organisations, and the review of the
Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976, are just some instances. In
some arenas, 'accountability' - usually meaning financial accountability to
government or to the wider public - is seen as being potentially
inconsistent with self-determination. Thus, for example, the Aboriginal
Social Justice Commissioner Michael Dodson sees a tension between
accountability and self-determination, believing that ATSIC must walk a
tightrope between expecting accountability from Aboriginal organisations
and promoting self-determination. He is quoted as saying in connection
with the tension between local-level allegiances within Aboriginal societies
and the requirement for wider public accountability that 'democratic
systems are an alien thing to Aboriginal culture' (The Australian, 6 April
1996).
Many of the issues of accountability, effectiveness and administrative
efficiency relating to funding of Indigenous organisations have been
extensively canvassed and critiqued by anthropologists and researchers
interested in public policy.2 There is a developed literature dealing with
Indigenous organisations as service deliverers (for example, work by
Martin 1990, 1995a; Dillon 1992, 1996; Sanders 1993a, 1993b; Smith
1993; Anderson and Brady 1995; and Sullivan 1996a, 1996b).
An equally extensive research literature exists addressing the political
issues of self-determination and self-management associated with
devolution of decision-making and administrative processes to regional
councils and community organisations (for example Sackett 1990; Rowse
1992; Coombs 1994; Fletcher 1994; Finlayson and Dale 1996). In the
community development and enterprise development field, there are
studies such as those by Dale (1991) and Wolfe (1993), and work done by
scholars at the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR).
CAEPR has paid particular attention to specific questions of funding
processes and program effectiveness in the context of self-determination
associated with the implementation of national policies such as the
Aboriginal Employment Development Policy and Working Nation
(Sanders 1993a; Smith 1993; Taylor 1993).
Two explanatory models and methodologies emerge from this literature.
On the one hand, the chain of administrative processes within Indigenous
organisations is examined to find the weak point where misapplication of
resources or corruption becomes systemic, and the bureaucratic solution is
generally to develop greater scrutiny of administrative processes through
performance indicators, quality controls, financial accountability
mechanisms and a general adherence to the rules of the administrative and
funding process.
The other model identifies the relationship between bureaucracy and
Indigenous clients as predicated on bureaucratic requirements (such as
equity of access, accountability, performance standards, effectiveness and
so forth), but which in practice, may be difficult to achieve given the
ambiguity of what clients understand by these 'indicators' and what the
bureaucracies expect (Sullivan 1996a, 1996b). This explanatory model
works on the basis of divining the cultural logics of both parties, and the
misunderstandings that can arise from the inter-cultural relationship.
The latter culturally-based model takes a more holistic approach to
management and administrative issues by recognising ambiguities inherent
in the relationship between Indigenous organisations and the bureaucracies
upon which they are dependant for funding and other support. For
example, a community organisation is never simply a mono-dimensional
entity, because although it may have as its formal goal the delivery of
services to the community in which it is located, it typically operates
informally in a number of other roles including that of representative of
local or regional political concerns. In this sense, many community
organisations have the status of intermediary points between different
cultural and political systems, as they attempt to negotiate between
differing political positions and cultural imperatives while still maintaining
legitimacy in both (see Sullivan 1988; Sackett 1990; Dillon 1992).
This paper is not primarily concerned however with theorising about 'self-
determination' as such. Discussion is essentially confined to what might be
termed 'organisational self-determination', that is the capacity of
Indigenous people to realise their goals through various kinds of
incorporated bodies. The paper broadly delineates, a conceptual framework
which links this form of self-determination with a notion of 'internal
accountability', that of an organisation to its Indigenous members, clients
or constituency. It further argues that this internal accountability is also
linked to 'public accountability1, the financial and other accountability of an
organisation to funding agencies and ultimately the wider public. It
suggests that a policy focus on specific mechanisms by which internal
accountability can be achieved and enhanced can assist in the realisation of
both self-determination and public accountability, and thus provide a way
forward in what can often be a sterile debate on whether to emphasise one
policy goal at the necessary expense of the other.
General policy climate
Many of the Indigenous organisations delivering services to their
communities and regions are incorporated under the Aboriginal Councils
and Associations Act 1976. This was enacted in part to provide a vehicle
for Commonwealth funding to Indigenous communities and groups where
the particular State or Territory was seen as being recalcitrant or hostile to
goals focusing on self-determination. It was seen by the then Department
of Aboriginal Affairs as offering Indigenous groups a relatively
straightforward route to legal recognition in order to receive funding for a
variety of purposes in accordance with Indigenous priorities and needs.3
There have been significant events in the Indigenous policy arena since the
passage of this Act. Of particular relevance here are the Royal Commission
into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (RCIADC), the formation of ATSIC
with its regional council structure, the Mabo High Court decision and its
implementation through the Native Title Act 1993, and more generally but
very significantly, the general increased emphasis at all levels of
government on equity, accountability, and efficiency in program delivery.
The RCIADC recommended that principles of self-determination should be
applied to the design and implementation of all policies and programs
affecting Aboriginal people, that there should be maximum devolution of
power to Aboriginal communities and organisations to determine their own
priorities for funding allocations, and that such organisations should, as a
matter of preference, be the vehicles through which programs are delivered
(Commonwealth of Australia 1991a: recommendations 188-192). The
RCIADC Overview Report refers to the central role of Aboriginal
organisations in self-determination and to their significance in the
Indigenous and non-Indigenous political realms and in service delivery in
such areas as health, legal rights, education and housing, particularly in the
case of those bodies which are adequately resourced (Commonwealth of
Australia 1991a: 1.8.1-1.8.3).
At the same time, the Report recognised that accountability had to be
maintained in the delivery of services by Indigenous organisations,
recommending such measures as the development of convenient and
simple financial accountability procedures, appropriate performance
indicators for programs, and the development of appropriate processes for
providing advice, training, and education to Aboriginal organisations
(Commonwealth of Australia 199la: recommendations 193-197). At no
stage did the RCIADC advocate self-determination or self-management
without accountability (Commonwealth of Australia 1991b: 14).
The ATSIC regional council structure has also attempted to implement
these principles. Thus, there are increasing requirements for financial
accountability at all levels of ATSIC. However, its support of community-
based programs reflects a devolution of decision-making powers,
especially in relation to funding and service delivery, from the central
bureaucracy to what is portrayed as a 'grass-roots' level in the regions, with
Indigenous organisations actively involved in service delivery.
The Mabo High Court decision and its implementation through the Native
Title Act 1993 provides a second set of parameters against which this
discussion needs to be set. Following Mabo, the original emphasis on 'self-
determination' - the political right asserted by an Indigenous people in a
pluralist society to determine certain dimensions of their own lives in
accordance with their own priorities - has to some extent at least been
replaced by legal rights flowing in the first instance from the recognition of
Indigenous laws and customs in relation to land. Much of this is as yet
potential rather than realised, but the particular case of regional agreements
is of great significance here.
A further, and to some extent conflicting, policy strand of relevance is the
increasing emphasis by government on ensuring programs and services are
managed so as to maximise their cost efficiency and effectiveness, on
ensuring that there is equitable access to these services, and that there are
mechanisms in place to ensure the accountability of programs both to
funding agencies and their clients. Increasingly, issues of accountability
have become paramount in bureaucratic investigation and political scrutiny
of ATSIC's system for allocation of funds, financial monitoring, and
acquittal procedures.
Placed against the demonstrated socioeconomic disadvantage that much of
Indigenous Australia suffers, such policy emphases in a time of major
budgetary cuts to ATSIC and other agencies directly impacting on
Indigenous people, inevitably lead to growing requirements for service
delivery by Indigenous organisations to be assessed in terms of efficiency,
cost effectiveness, and demonstrable outcomes. It is clear that this trend
will be accentuated under the Coalition government, with its move from
what it terms the 'symbolic' to 'service delivery' in Indigenous affairs.
Consequently, the ongoing demands for self-determination by Indigenous
leaders now take place in a political climate highly attuned to questions of
fiscal responsibility and demonstrable outcomes and alert to real and
potential breaches of accountability.
The Aboriginal domain and 'community' organisations
A fundamental issue in considering 'self-determination' or indeed 'self-
management' is the societal scale at which it is to be considered. What are
the social, political and economic characteristics, the internal structures,
and the bounds and extent of the units which are to determine or manage
themselves? What are the contexts in which self-determination or
management are to operate, and who is to determine them? These
questions can be usefully considered in terms of how two distinct types of
political system articulate; those derived principally from the Aboriginal
domain; and those derived principally from that of the 'mainstream'
society. There is considerable diversity within Aboriginal Australia, but
there are also core cultural themes which are shared across the country,
and this paper first sketches in some broad relevant features of this
'Aboriginal commonality' to borrow Sansom's (1982) term, relating to
political organisation.
The Aboriginal domain is typically highly factionalised, and characterised
by the complex and often cross-cutting allegiances which people have to
groupings based on families, clans, ancestral lands and so forth, as well as
to contemporary forms such as Aboriginal organisations. A defining
characteristic of this domain lies in its localism, in which the political,
economic, and social imperatives lie, pre-eminently in more restricted
forms and institutionsrather than in broader and more encompassing ones.
'Local' can be either social or geographic or both, and the two are
frequently related, for example, through relations based on affiliations to
traditional lands. Localism is characterised by such features as a strong
emphasis on individual autonomy, and by priority being accorded to values
and issues which are grounded in the particular and local, rather than in the
general and regional or national. It is related to the tendency of Aboriginal
societies and groups towards 'fission' and disaggregation rather than
aggregation and corporateness (Martin 1995a; Sutton 1995).
Localism can take different forms in different Aboriginal societies. For
example, in western Cape York Peninsula it may be based upon region-of-
origin groupings (particularly descent-based groups such as sibling sets),
while in many urban societies it may be based upon what are termed
'families' defined through complex historical, region-of-origin and
genealogical linkages. Some Aboriginal societies have more emphasis on
localism (such as many in Cape York Peninsula), while others are
characterised by significant sub-regional and regional political, religious
and economic forms which dilute the significance of localism in certain
contexts (for example, with ceremony in the central desert regions, and in
Arnhem Land).
Localism also tends to be contextual in its scope. Because it is grounded in
the particularities of small-scale groupings, shared values, events, and so
forth, its extent is dependent upon the particular issues around which
political or economic action is being undertaken. Consequently, an
Aboriginal organisation's constituency may be fluid and context
dependent; for example, its composition and extent may be dependent
upon such factors as the relevant issue, who is seen as having legitimate
interests in it, and how much support they can command over that issue.
These are some of the factors which underlie another notable characteristic
of the Aboriginal domain, a high degree of fluidity in political and
organisational process.4
Thus, while the governing bodies of Aboriginal organisations may be
construed by the wider bureaucratic system as 'representing' their
communities or regions, they are also embedded within particular networks
of kin, have attachments to particular locales and language or other
traditionally-based groupings, and are associated with particular
community organisations. They are therefore embedded within specific
matrices of rights, obligations, and allegiances which are crucial
constitutive elements of the Aboriginal social and political realm. The
complex social calculus upon which decisions are made and social
relations negotiated within this realm can not be easily discarded as
Aboriginal people undertake their roles within organisations, to be replaced
with one predicated upon nominally objective assessment of competing
demands for scarce resources, financial accountability, equity in access to
services, and the setting aside of individual and family interests in favour
of those of a broader 'community'. Yet, it is precisely such principles and
processes which are required by the wider system.
A second relevant characteristic of the Aboriginal domain concerns styles
of political and social process, such as decision-making, which typically
serve to preserve the autonomy and independence of the participants
(Brenneis and Myers 1984; Martin 1993). The strong value placed on
individual and local-group rights and autonomy means that sustaining
cooperative effort over more than a relatively limited social or
geographical extent can be highly problematic. In such a system,
achieving political unity or even the semblance of common purpose can
be a significant accomplishment in itself. Political discourse, including
that in meetings of contemporary organisations, can serve primarily the
purposes of establishing and negotiating the internal social and political
relationships which are of paramount concern within Aboriginal societies,
rather than what the wider system might regard as 'outcomes'. As Brenneis
and Myers (1984: 14) propose more generally of political rhetoric in
similarly egalitarian societies:
... the goal of political discourse may be neither a decision nor coercion but
rather the sustaining of an appearance of autonomy while at the same time
constituting or reconstituting a polity. They seem largely the product of
negotiating acceptable interpretations, both of the event and of the relationship
of the parties.
This is not to deny that Aboriginal politicking can be as intense and
indeed vitriolic as any other, or that pressure and sometimes coercion are
not brought to bear to achieve particular ends. In fact, in some
circumstances what Brenneis and Myers have termed 'constituting or
reconstituting a polity' can centre on maintaining the differences and
separation between individuals and groups which are such a feature of the
Aboriginal political domain, while in others it may focus on establishing,
if only for die meeting or discussion itself, a semblance of broader unity,
while the rights of participants to maintain their autonomy are ultimately
preserved.
Aboriginal organisations have become the locus for politicking over the
resources, both tangible and intangible, which can be obtained through
them. They are often the focal points for an ongoing struggle over
authority, legitimacy and influence between different groups and factions,
both within the Aboriginal sphere and vis-a-vis the wider one. They are
also key means by which different groups can attempt to capture resources
such as grants from ATSIC and other agencies. This is not to say that all
attempts by Aboriginal organisations to gain access to resources should
simply be seen as reflections of internal politicking, but it would be naive
to ignore the role of such resources in sustaining hierarchies and
differentiation, whether in Aboriginal societies or the wider one.
Nonetheless, tangible resources, such as grants or the materiel they can
purchase like vehicles, typically serve particular Aboriginal ends which
arise from principles and imperatives of the Aboriginal domain. Here,
wealth ultimately lies in social capital rather than other forms, and what is
competed for is not so much the resources in themselves, but their capacity
to create and sustain wealth in the form of social relationships (Martin
1995b).
A further and related characteristic of the Aboriginal domain is that forms
of 'representativeness' are not necessarily based upon individual equality
measured against some abstract set of democratically constituted principles
by which people have equal rights to participate in the political process.
Rather, like the British House of Lords, rights within this domain are
typically based more on having (or asserting) particular interests and
qualifications - membership of a particular family or descent line, land
ownership, seniority, knowledge, ritual authority, and so forth - than on the
philosophies such as those underlying universal suffrage, or the principles
of equity supposedly underlying service delivery (for example, ATSIC
1995; Finlayson 1995; Smith 1996a).
In summary, Aboriginal political systems strongly emphasise individual
and local-group autonomy, are often characterised by an intense localism,
and are typically concerned with negotiating internal relationships. In such
systems, the notions of representation underlying the mainstream political
system by which individuals cede or delegate decision-making powers to
others, can be very problematic. The dimensions of what - and who - is
actually being 'represented' by an Aboriginal organisation, for example,
may differ according to context and circumstances, and be contested
between the organisation and its constituents (Smith 1995). Thus, an
Aboriginal Council for a Queensland community may assert the legitimacy
to make decisions on behalf of its nominal constituents on a whole range of
issues, and be given the authority to do so by statute. This legitimacy may,
however, be denied by its constituents when the matter concerns
management of traditional lands (frequently a matter of core concern to
Aboriginal people), or imposition of alcohol controls, but accepted in the
maintenance of community infrastructure (often a matter of peripheral
concern).
Therefore, accountability itself is often assessed by Aboriginal people
against local priorities and values, rather than the broader ones typically
emphasised by bureaucracies. If being 'accountable' for an organisation
means having mechanisms in place by which it can be called to account by
its constituents, then there will inevitably be tension and conflict between
the requirements to be accountable to a broader set of interests (including,
for example, to government) and the demands to be accountable to
particular locally-based interests. The latter can, from the point of view of
the organisation, be at least as compelling as the former (see also Altman
quoted in House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal
Affairs (HRSCAA) 1990: 110). This poses a particular challenge for what
is to be understood by 'self-determination'. Given the primacy of the local,
who and what constitutes the 'self who is to be determining is mostly left
unexamined. Important questions are raised about who in fact are to be
self-determining or self-managing, about what issues, and in what
contexts.5
However, it would not be correct to see Aboriginal political process solely
in terms of 'atomism' or localism. Localism exists alongside various forms
of collectivism, as Sutton (1995) and Smith (1995) amongst many others
has noted. Collectivism has many manifestations from, for example, ritual
performances in traditionally orientated societies, to the establishment of
various kinds of bodies under State or Federal legislation for a multitude of
purposes. Organisations such as Land Councils and ATSIC itself are
becoming powerful vehicles through which new forms of Aboriginal
collective political and economic enterprises are being forged, at regional
and national levels. Arguably, they have provided the institutional base
from which both a regionally-based leadership and an informal coalition of
Aboriginal leaders has emerged in recent years, in a hitherto unprecedented
fashion.
The critical point is that there can be significant incommensurabilities
between Aboriginal systems predicated upon localism and characterised
by fluidity and negotiability in social and political process, and the kind of
corporateness entailed in such contemporary organisational structures.
This paper now turns to considering the implications of this analysis for
Aboriginal organisational structures, in attempting to reconcile
accountability and self-determination.
Self-management, self-determination and accountability
The HRSCAA, in its 1990 report Our Futures Our Selves drew a
distinction between 'self-determination' and 'self-management'. The latter
focuses on efficient administration of communities and organisations
(which it tied principally to a local government framework), whereas the
former goes beyond this and implies control over policy and decision-
making, particularly the determination of structures, processes and
priorities (HRSCAA 1990: 4,107). The HRSCAA report argued that there
is at least potential conflict between the principles of self-determination,
and bureaucratic requirements for accountability which could result in
various forms of unwelcome monitoring and intervention in the affairs of
Aboriginal organisations.
Statistics indicate clearly that educational and skills attainment levels for
Indigenous Australians are significantly lower than those for non-
Indigenous people (for example, Taylor 1993; Smith and Daly 1996). Yet,
the effective management of Indigenous organisations and the
minimisation of intrusive monitoring and of interventions following their
collapse - is dependent upon skilled and knowledgeable personnel.
Moreover, an important aspect of both self-determination and self-
management lies in increasing available employment opportunities. As
noted by Dillon (1992), a key feature of most ATSIC programs is that
intermediary Indigenous organisations (many of them incorporated under
the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act) are utilised to deliver
programs to Indigenous people, and thus particularly difficult problems are
posed for performance monitoring. Dillon argues that'... a key element in
evaluating the performance of the Commission's programs must be an
assessment of the capacity and capability of intermediary Aboriginal
organisations'. He observes that for many Indigenous organisations, a key
objective is to maximise Indigenous employment, and that while this is an
objective shared by both ATSIC and government more broadly, there is the
risk that this might take precedence over the explicit objectives for which
funding was provided (Dillon 1992: 100).
The 1994 National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Survey estimated
that nearly 19 per cent of the Indigenous workforce was employed by
community organisations (Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 1996). It
is clear that such bodies are quite significant providers of employment for
Indigenous people in a context of large-scale unemployment. As Taylor
and Liu (1996: 23) note, given the small size of many of these
organisations and their relatively limited scope of activities, generating
employment mobility through them is severely limited. However,
employment outcomes from labour market placements in such community
organisations are often more successful than other placements. Working
for such organisations can often have culturally-derived goals other than
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simply employment. Programs delivered through such organisations can
therefore have multiple outcomes which render the process of program
monitoring even more difficult (Altman 1991).
Nevertheless, Aboriginal organisations, both at the local or sub-regional
level in terms of community-based bodies, regionally in the case of Land
Councils and ATSIC's regional councils, and nationally through the
ATSIC Board of Commissioners, have been seen as fundamental to self-
determination. As noted, the RCIADC was of the view that Aboriginal
organisations had a pivotal role in self-determination, and that there
should be maximum devolution of control over funding allocations and
decisions to Aboriginal communities and organisations (Commonwealth
of Australia 1991a: recommendations 188-192). Equivalently, it is
envisaged by ATSIC that, ultimately, its regional planning framework will
be able to coordinate regional service delivery to Aboriginal people by
other levels of government with those of the Commonwealth, provide a
mechanism to monitor the effectiveness and appropriateness of policies
and services, and enable Indigenous participation in the planning
processes of other agencies (ATSIC 1994: E3). The ATSIC regional
planning process is seen as providing 'a significant step in Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islanders achieving self-determinationand self-management'
(ATSIC 1992: 6).
Accountability
Aboriginal organisations, of necessity, must operate in the ambiguous and
fraught zone between the two political and cultural systems, the
Aboriginal one and that of the wider society (Sullivan 1988; Martin
1995a). In this context, the fundamental questions of effectiveness,
legitimacy, representativeness, and of accountability are constantly
contested in terms of the sometimes incommensurate principles of each of
the two political domains. In the case of accountability for example, there
are often quite incompatible demands on personnel in such organisations
to discharge their obligations to the wider system (usually framed in terms
of financial accountability),and those within the Aboriginal polity.
The two major Northern Territory Land Councils are arguably amongst the
most effective Aboriginal organisations in the country, in terms of capacity
to discharge statutory obligations, relative administrative efficiency, the
mechanisms developed to deliver services equitably to constituencies, and
their roles in political advocacy for Aboriginal interests (Altman and
Dillon 1988; Auditor-General 1993). However, they have been subject to
stringent criticisms from various quarters, including from within their own
constituencies, and there is ongoing pressure in several regions to establish
regionally-based "breakaway1 land councils (Martin 1995b).
The effectiveness of the Land Councils is disputed by proponents for
breakaway bodies, both because they are considered to be large remote
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bureaucracies and because their staff, who include non-Aboriginal people,
are seen as being unable to understand the concerns of traditional owners;
their legitimacy in exercising management and control of Aboriginal lands
is challenged; they are seen to be unrepresentative because they do not
encompass the full range of Aboriginal land interests across particular
regions; and they are not considered to be accountable to Aboriginal
traditional land owners, since the principles of Aboriginal Law are not
recognised by the existing Councils, as manifested for example by the
persistent problems over royalty distributions (Martin 1995b: 73).
The Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 attempts to
establish structures and processes whereby these incommensurabilities are
addressed in terms of the principles of each political domain (Martin
1995b). In essence, effectiveness, legitimacy, representativeness, and
accountability within the wider political system are established by setting
up an organisation with the resources, including funding, to undertake its
statutory roles in a professional manner, under the general direction of a
Council which is broadly 'representative' of major cultural blocs. A crucial
mechanism for establishing effectiveness, legitimacy and accountability
within the Aboriginal domain is the 'informed consent' provisions in the
Act. These provide a mandatory process by which formal instructions have
to be obtained from the relevant traditional owners, before the Council can
make any decisions on issuing exploration permits and other commercial
interests. In the words of Justice Toohey:
The Act seeks to implement two principles. One is to ensure that the traditional
owners understand and consent to any action that may affect the land. The
other is to interpose a Land Council between the traditional owners and those
who wish to deal in some way with Aboriginal land. The Council is a body
which is identifiable and with which others may deal more readily than with
the traditional owners, who may be scattered over a substantial area and whose
precise identity may mot be easily ascertainable (Toohey 1984: 56).
The 'informed consent' provisions of this Act have proved to be a
powerful and legally enforceable weapon in ensuring the accountability of
the Land Councils to their constituents.6
As previously discussed, many Aboriginal community-based organisations
are incorporated under the Commonwealth Aboriginal Councils and
Associations Act 1976. The principal form in which accountability is
referred to in this Act is in terms of financial and procedural accountability
to the Registrar's Office, which has a pivotal role in this regard, and it is
these provisions which have received the most attention in amendments to
the Act since its original passage. They cover such matters as approvals
required for rules, objects, membership and so forth, prior to incorporation,
notification of subsequent alterations to the objects and rules, annual
submission of an up-to-date list of members, and annual submission of a
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'Committee's Report' on compliance with the Act, its Regulations and the
association's rules, including an audited financial statement.
This Act gives far less attention to accountability within the organisation.
Various sections require members of the governing committee to act
'honestly and diligently', to disclose any conflict of interest, and establish
that the rules of an association have the force of a contract between it and
each member, between it and each member of the governing committee,
and between members. The Act allows the Registrar to appoint an
administrator on the grounds that the governing committee has failed to act
in the interests of the association's members. The basic mechanism in the
scheme of the Act by which an organisation's executive - and staff - are to
be held accountable to its members is by means of the annual general
meeting and special general meetings which are to be provided for in its
rules. The annual general meeting is seen in this Act as in other
incorporation schemes as providing an essential forum for discussion
between the governing committee and the members of the corporation, and
as a means of facilitating informed decision-making. The presentation of
the annual report to members at annual general meetings is seen as
enabling them to scrutinise the operation of the corporation and thus
exercise effective control over its operation.
There is no direct attention given in the Act to mechanisms for
accountability of an organisation to its clients or its constituency, for
instance in the case of organisations delivering services to an Indigenous
population wider than its membership. The discrepancy between the
membership of an organisation and its constituency can be a significant
one, a matter to which this discussion will return shortly. It has particular
import however in the matter of conceptualising accountability for
Aboriginal organisations, for it would be relatively rare for the
membership of an association primarily concerned with service delivery to
correspond to its constituency or clients.
Rowse (1992: 72) in writing of Wolfe's (1989) discussion of Aboriginal
local government organisations characterises these two forms of
accountability, external and internal, in slightly different terms:
The 'bureaucratic' view emphasises fiscal accountability, efficiency, co-
ordination and the effective representation of local needs, the 'radical' view,
representativeness, accountability, responsiveness and equity.
A point of some generality, and one which has been made by others (for
example, Queensland Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts 1991:
31-35) is that these are not two incommensurate forms of accountability,
but in fact are necessarily linked. The case studies undertaken by the
authors for the review of the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act
1976 (Finlayson 1996; Martin 1996b) suggest that those organisations
which had developed broadly representative structures, and had instituted
13
procedures to maximise equity in service delivery, participation in
decision-making, and accountability to their constituencies in achieving
their objectives had also achieved at least reasonable fiscal accountability;
conversely, those which had deficient or virtually non-existent
mechanisms to ensure such principles were more likely to demonstrate
poor financial accountability. That is, organisations which are accountable
to their members or constituencies are more likely to be effective in what
they undertake and more financially accountable (ATSIC 1995).
Furthermore, while internal accountability certainly relates to such factors
as representativeness, responsiveness and equity as Rowse suggests, there
are also crucial dimensions of it which arise from the Aboriginal political
and social domain, and can be expressed for instance through relations of
kinship, familial obligations, and culturally defined rights to speak about
particular matters. The most effective organisations appear to be those
which have made creative use of principles drawn from both domains in
establishing structures and processes which seek to maximise internal
accountability.
However, there is often a tension between principles drawn from the
wider socio-political sphere such as those of broadly based equity and
access to services and resources, and the imperatives of the Aboriginal
domain. In such circumstances, the principle of the 'common good' which
undeipins notions such as equity of access to resources and services can
be rendered problematic, unless organisational structures and processes
can take account of and incorporate the realities of localism, while still
enabling effective and accountable services to the broader Aboriginal
constituency. This tension then poses a fundamental challenge, both to
Aboriginal organisations and indeed to policy makers. While it may not be
capable of 'resolution' in any easy sense, incorporating mechanisms to
enhance the internal accountability of Aboriginal organisations can allow
it to be more productively dealt with.
Mechanisms to enhance internal accountability
If, as argued above, external or public accountability is predicated upon
and related to internal accountability, then the focus for ensuring better
public accountability should not only be on such factors as increased
statutory and administrative requirements for more rigorous financial
reporting mechanisms, and the measurement of efficiency and
effectiveness through the development of performance indicators.
Attention should also be given to providing frameworks - including
statutory - which assist Aboriginal organisations to develop better
mechanisms for accountability to their constituencies. Given the broad
principles underlying the Aboriginal domain previously discussed, there
are a number of mechanisms which could be advanced to facilitate better
internal accountability.
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Firstly, internal accountability is dependent upon whether an organisation
provides an adequately 'representative' structure - that is, incorporates
mechanisms for encompassing the particular local-level diversity of its
membership or constituency which is relevant to its goals, for instance in
the composition of its executive. There are many Aboriginal organisations
whose wider recognition and funding are predicated upon and legitimised
by the provision of services to a sub-regional or regional Aboriginal
constituency, but whose memberships and executives are in fact drawn
from sub-groups, often particular families. Such organisations could be
considered equivalent to the mainstream 'family businesses' but generally
they do not attempt to become viable through accruing a sustainable capital
base in selling products or services in the competitive mainstream
economy. Rather, such Aboriginal 'family businesses' attempt to accrue
social capital, in the form of influence and legitimacy within a highly
contested and competitive Aboriginal sphere, through gaining access to
grants and other such resources (Martin 1995c). This can be the source of
trenchant criticism, including by Aboriginal people themselves, that such
organisations are using funds, provided to service a wider Aboriginal
constituency, for self-aggrandisement.
Depending on such factors as whether the organisation is in remote or
urban Australia, and covers a local district, a sub-region or a wider area,
the incorporation of diversity could be in terms of representation from land
or language-based groupings, 'family' groups, or 'communities' (see for
example ATSIC 1995; Smith 1995, 1996a). The nature of the groupings
being represented would also be dependent upon precisely what the
organisation's objects are; for example, in many areas it is considered
important to include specific representation from women and from younger
people in organisations concerned with contemporary issues such as law
and justice. As another instance, while the residential constituency for a
body managing Aboriginal lands might nominally be the same as that for
an Aboriginal Council concerned primarily with the delivery of local
government services there, the representative structure for the former
would appropriately incorporate those with traditional authority over the
lands concerned, whereas the latter would usually comprise a wider range
of younger, less authoritativepeople elected under the relevant State and
Territory legislation.
The requirement to incorporate representativeness could be included in an
organisation's constitution, and where appropriate in the statute under
which it is incorporated or functions. Nevertheless, given the complexity of
Aboriginal societies, it would not be feasible in most cases for all the
divergent interests in a community, let alone across a region, to be
incorporated into an organisation's structure. In the case of Native Title
Representative Bodies, for example, section 202 of the Native Title Act
1993 merely requires the organisation to be 'broadly representative' of the
Indigenous people of the region of its operation, without specifying the
precise basis on which this is to be achieved.7 The issue in general is
arguably not how to include all Aboriginal interests in a representative
structure, but ensuring that there is a broadly inclusive incorporation of
those major interest groups which are relevant to the particular objects of
the organisation.
Moreover, particularly in the case of service-delivery or advocacy
organisations (such as Land Councils and Native Title Representative
Bodies, housing associations, and health and legal aid services),
developing a broadly incorporative structure is only one of the mechanisms
for facilitating internal accountability, albeit one on which Aboriginal
people themselves frequently focus. Given the culturally based primacy of
local social groupings, and the resistance to ceding individual or local-
group autonomy even to nominally 'representative1 organisations, there is
often intense pressure to either expand the size and representative basis of
organisations beyond their logistically feasible limits, or to form new ones
based on more particularistic interests through a continuing process of
fission.
This emphasis in much of Aboriginal organisational politics on the
management of internal social and political relations over 'outcomes' to the
constituency has already been mentioned. However, there are effective
Aboriginal service delivery and advocacy organisations who have
developed mechanisms to ensure equity in their service delivery and access
to the particular resources they provide, measures to maximise the
professionalism and accountability of their staff, procedures to ensure
transparency in decision-making, and mechanisms by which decisions can
be reassessed and conflicts arbitrated. The Northern and Central Land
Councils are examples of such organisations, and there are certain more
recently established Native Title Representative Bodies such as the Cape
York Land Council and the Aboriginal Legal Rights Movement in South
Australia which have made considerable progress in working towards such
mechanisms (ATSIC 1995).
There are many factors which underlie the capacity of organisations -
Indigenous or otherwise - to achieve these professional standards. Some,
such as the pivotal roles which can be played by highly motivated and
talented individuals, essentially lie outside the province of either regulatory
schemes or the appropriateness or otherwise of organisations' constitutions.
However, appropriate constitutions could provide frameworks which on
the one hand are enabling, providing an incentive and guidelines for
organisations to develop procedures and structures which maximise
internal accountability. These frameworks could also be regulatory,
providing a set of clearly defined standards against which organisations'
performance can be assessed and means for redressing failures, both for
constituents and regulatory authorities.
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For example, service delivery organisations could have clauses in their
constitutions which require them to develop protocols to maximise
accountability to their constituencies, to ensure that their service delivery is
equitable and needs-based, to facilitate open and transparent decision-
making and reporting, to establish grievance procedures, and to consult
with their constituencies in the development of these various protocols.
There could also be clauses which require the organisation to have
independent staff selection procedures, and contractual and other
arrangements in place through which staff and senior management are
required to work to achieve its objectives.
The development of such protocols for community-based service delivery
organisations could be mandatory under a statutory scheme such as the
Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act, or it could be a condition for
funding by agencies such as ATSIC. These requirements, whether within
constitutions, statutes, or funding agency guidelines, would not need to be
prescriptive and definitive, but could establish the broad principles and
prerequisites for such protocols, including local consultation in their
development. In implementing them, an organisation could choose to use
processes for consultation, decision-making, reporting back to constituents
and so forth which are derived from the mainstream society. However,
there could also be provision for there to be mechanisms which are in
accordance with Aboriginal tradition, if that is deemed appropriate. These
could include calling for submissions on policy or service delivery for
instance which could be in either verbal or written form, and mechanisms
for reporting back to constituencies through such means as community
meetings and other traditional mechanisms, as well as written annual
reports.
Internal accountability would also be enhanced for organisations in which
the objects set out in the constitution are sufficiently broad to reflect the
real concerns and interests of the constituency, but not so general that the
organisation can be captured by a particular interest group and re-directed
without reference to the constituency (Altman and Smith 1994).
Furthermore, the particular equity and accountability mechanisms
established by an organisation could be expressly linked to its objects;
those for a housing association for example would differ from those for a
Native Title Representative Body.
Membership versus constituency
A further significant factor in establishing internal accountability for
Aboriginal organisations is whether processes other than general meetings
are available for its members and also its constituency and clients to have
an input into its operations, particularly into its service delivery where this
is a function of the body. The Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act
1976, for example, establishes the membership of an association as the
group who control it, mainly through electing a governing committee at
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the annual general meeting, and to whom the committee is held
accountable in running the association's affairs. One of the grounds on
which the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations set up under that Act can
appoint an administrator is that the committee has not been acting in the
interests of the members. The requirement for a minimum number of
Indigenous members is also one of the principal procedural matters with
which the Registrar has to be satisfied before an association can be
incorporated.
Clearly, where associations are formed to advance the interests of, or
provide services to, a broad sub-regional or regional population, it would
not be feasible to have every individual listed as a member. Of necessity
therefore, for such Indigenous organisations, the formal membership would
at best be a small proportion of the Indigenous clients to whom it is
delivering services (as in the case of a regionally-based medical or legal
service), or of its constituency (as in the case of Land Councils).8 However,
there are no requirements in the Act at present to ensure that the
membership, or the governing committee which it elects, incorporates or
represents the various groupings which the association serves.
This issue has major ramifications for establishing accountability for many
Aboriginal organisations. It is also of significance where disputes arise
within associations, or between them and their nominal constituencies.
Because of the reliance of the present scheme of the Act on the category of
membership, it actually encourages either 'fission' where disaffected
members form a breakaway organisation, or attempts to take it over at
general meetings through challenges to membership entitlement, stacking
with supporters of a particular faction, and so forth. It is not at all
uncommon for such 'factional fights' over control of associations to take
place. In such circumstances, while the Registrar has the capacity to
arbitrate in disputes between an association and its members for those
bodies incorporated under the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act,
he or she does not appear to have the power to arbitrate where there is
dispute as to whether the individuals are members or not. That is, where
there is a dispute as to the very basis of an association, its membership and
its committee, the Registrar cannot arbitrate.
If the present regulatory and statutory schemes such as that of the current
Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act were less reliant upon the
formal category of membership for those organisations which are
primarily concerned with service delivery, incorporated better
mechanisms for accountability to the broader constituencies such
organisations claim to serve, and contained broader performance*
monitoring and arbitration provisions, such disputes would arguably be
less likely and more capable of productive resolution. Again, such
requirements could lie at one or more levels - in the legislation under
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which organisations incorporated, in organisations constitutions, or in
agency funding guidelines.
Cultural appropriateness
Aboriginal organisations have the complex task of negotiating between
the differing political positions and cultural imperatives of mainstream
and Aboriginal domains, while still maintaining legitimacy in both. There
is thus clearly a potential tension between Aboriginal self-management, in
terms of administering the affairs of such organisations, and the
achievement of broader self-determination through them, in terms of
Aboriginal people having control over the key decision-making, priorities,
and structures which affect their lives (HRSCAA 1990: 4). From this
perspective, the matter of the 'cultural appropriateness1 or otherwise of
organisations takes on a new significance, for those which have
organisational structures, decision-making processes, reporting and
accountability mechanisms which draw upon Indigenous principles as
well as those of the mainstream are more likely to be accountable to their
constituencies and effective in delivering services to them.
However, the term 'cultural appropriateness' has taken on a life of its own,
both in Aboriginal political rhetoric and bureaucratic discourse, and is
generally used uncritically. An argument frequently advanced in favour of
incorporation under the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act rather
than other State or Territory legislation is that it allows for more culturally
appropriate organisational processes than does mainstream legislation.
However, in reality it does not measure up well against this principle. The
Act allows for an incorporated association's rules on any matter to be based
on 'Aboriginal custom'. It is not clear what percentage of the more than
2000 associations presently incorporated under the Act have taken
advantage of this feature to incorporate culturally appropriate rules in such
areas as decision-making processes and membership entitlements. Few of
those in the Queensland case studies conducted for the Review of the Act
(Finlayson 1996; Martin 1996a) had done so, and very few of the
Indigenous people consulted during the course of the case studies had a
clear conception of what might comprise 'culturally appropriate'
mechanisms in the running of their organisations. Some of those working
in organisations serving wider regional populations in fact felt that it was
not a relevant issue for them, and that what was of prime concern was
ensuring accountability to their constituencies. For others, being 'culturally
appropriate' meant being able to incorporate elders into decision-making in
a suitable fashion, and they felt that the Act did not facilitate this (Martin
and Finlayson 1996).
Certainly, the case could be argued for the Aboriginal Councils and
Associations Act to facilitate the utilisation of Indigenous political, social
and cultural mechanisms wherever possible and appropriate. Incorporating
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tradition, or customary law, into the legislation would be in accordance
with the recommendations in the Australian Law Reform Commission
report on the recognition of Aboriginal customary law (Law Reform
Commission 1986), recommendation 219 of the RCIADC, and with the
Fundamental Legislative Principle (in the Queensland jurisdiction at least)
that there be regard to 'Aboriginal tradition' in legislation.
While the present Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act refers to
'Aboriginal custom', which is not defined, there is an established body of
legal interpretation for 'Aboriginal tradition', for example, through the
operations of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act and the
Queensland Aboriginal Land Act where it is defined as:
... the body of traditions, observances, customs and beliefs of Aboriginal
people generally or of a particular group of Aboriginal people, and includes
any such observances, customs and beliefs relating to particular persons, areas,
objects or relationships.
Such a definition clearly has potential application to the running of the
affairs of Indigenous organisations, but the implications of 'cultural
appropriateness' need to be seen as far more than just allowing for certain
kinds of decision-making or the incorporation of elders into the running of
organisations, although these may be important in some instances. The
real import of incorporating cultural appropriateness into the operations of
Aboriginal organisations, arguably, would lie in the recognition that
Aboriginal principles of social, political and economic organisation could
be used by Aboriginal associations where they saw it as relevant.
There are a number of areas where such principles could be fruitfully
considered. As discussed previously, given the 'intense localism'
characteristic of Aboriginal political organisation, far more attention could
be paid to service-delivery organisations' accountability mechanisms to
their broader constituencies or to their clients, not just to their members,
where this is relevant to the stated objectives of the association. Given this
localism, and the characteristics of Aboriginal political and decision-
making processes discussed previously, the reliance on general meetings as
the principal means by which accountability is to be maintained to
members and constituents is seriously flawed. A range of other measures
could additionally be incorporated, either into legislation or into
organisations' constitutions, relating to such matters as the structure of
executives, meeting procedures, decision-making processes, reporting and
other accountability mechanisms, and a requirement to develop
consultation protocols with constituencies, which are informed by the
principles and values of the particular Aboriginal group, community or
region in which the organisation is based.
Thus, the members of governing bodies of Aboriginal organisations could
be able to be selected by a number of means, including following
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principles of Aboriginal tradition where relevant. While voting might be
appropriate for representation on a community council delivering local
government services, for a group based on traditional associations with
land it may be more appropriate to 'nominate' in accordance with their
traditions, a representative to a Land Council or Native Title
Representative Body who has the requisite authority to speak for that land.
Additionally, given the importance of contemporary Aboriginal
organisations in the social, economic and political spheres, legislation such
as the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act should be flexible and
allow organisations' executives to include members drawn from other
incorporated bodies in the region, or from other kinds of groups including
those which under tradition constitute the Indigenous people there (for
example, based on language affiliation). This would be particularly
important for bodies serving sub-regional and regional populations, such as
regional legal aid services, health councils, medical services, and Land
Councils and Native Title Representative Bodies.
With reference to the scheme of the Aboriginal Councils and Associations
Act, since it is designed specifically as a mechanism for incorporating
Indigenous organisations, there should be the flexibility to have governing
committee structures take account of contemporary Aboriginal principles,
for instance in allowing the establishment of a super-ordinate group of
senior people with recognised authority, should an organisation consider it
appropriate. Equally, there should be the capacity for meetings to be
conducted and decisions taken in accordance with Aboriginal tradition.
There are precedents for this in other legislation, for example, in the
regulations of the Queensland Aboriginal Land Act 1991 governing the
operations of Aboriginal Land Trusts. The principles of 'cultural
appropriateness' should also be extended to the wider administrative
processes within which this Act is embedded. This should apply in a
number of areas. For instance, contemporary practice dictates that
legislation should be drafted in as plain and straightforward a fashion as
possible, and preambles are used to set out the broad intention of the
particular Act. The Registrar's office could be given the task of producing
written and other materials which set out such matters as the scheme of the
Act and the responsibilities of governing bodies in a manner which is both
comprehensive and accessible to Indigenous people.
An instance of the attempt to incorporate the recognition of Aboriginal
tradition and principles of social and political organisation into legislation,
can be seen in the recent (1995) amendments to the Queensland Local
Government (Aboriginal Lands) Act 1978, which allow for the
establishment of a Law Council to control alcohol in the Aurukun Shire.
This innovative legislation has adopted the 'enabling' process referred to
above in attempting to reconcile the need for Indigenous principles to be
recognised while not attempting to codify them, and maintaining
mechanisms to ensure public accountability and probity in the process.
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Policy implications: linking accountability and self-determination
How can the apparently conflicting policy goals of self-determination and
of public accountability be linked? The Commonwealth Ombudsman in
her 1994-95 annual report wrote that 'ATSIC has the task of forging the
twin goals of self-determination and accountability. These goals should
not be seen as inconsistent. Accountability and transparency of decision-
making should be important for all key stakeholders' (Commonwealth
Ombudsman 1995: 123). The Ombudsman goes on to link these two
policy goals through notions of equity and transparency in service
delivery. This connection is drawn from the political and organisational
principles of the dominant political domain, but there are other ways in
which they can be linked which take into account the principles and logic
of the Aboriginal political domain.
Firstly, this paper has argued that external or public accountability is
inextricably linked to internal accountability.The focus in the media and in
much public and policy-related discussion has been on external
accountability, defined primarily in terms of its financial dimensions.
Broadly speaking, the arguments are that where Indigenous organisations
are being funded through public monies, there is an entirely legitimate
expectation that funds will be used for the purposes for which they were
intended, and that outcomes can be demonstrated. Such expectations of
financial accountability are legitimate, and a focus on outcomes is arguably
an imperative given the demonstrated socioeconomic disadvantage
suffered by many Aboriginal people.
There has been less discussion about internal accountability - that is, the
accountability of organisations to their memberships and constituencies or
clients. While there are important aspects of this form of accountability
which relate to such factors as representativeness, responsiveness and to
equity, there are also significant dimensions which derive primarily from
the Aboriginal political and social domain. This paper has argued that
Aboriginal organisational politics is frequently characterised by a high
degree of factionalism and localism, in which the political, social and
economic imperatives lie within various forms of local group rather than
some broader aggregate or 'community', by a focus on negotiating internal
relationships rather than necessarily on demonstrable outcomes, by
particular styles of political process and decision-making which emphasise
the autonomy of the participants and their resistance to domination by
others, and by notions of 'representativeness' which are not based on equal
rights to participate in the political process but on having or asserting
particular culturally-constructed interests and rights to speak on specific
issues.
A common argument is that small Aboriginal organisations are more likely
to be accountable to their constituents. For instance, this appears to be at
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least the public premise on which the Northern Territory Government
supports the establishment of smaller 'breakaway' land councils (Martin
1995b). There is a certain element of truth to this, but such views depend in
no small part on a radical redefinition of who precisely the constituents are.
They also paradoxically ignore the defining feature of the Aboriginal
polity, its intense emphasis on localism. Ultimately, with such an
emphasis, any notion of 'representativeness' itself (in a western democratic
sense) becomes problematic, and small locally or regionally-based
organisations can be just as unrepresentative as larger ones. The crucial
issue is arguably one of the processes established, rather than the size of
the organisation.
In such circumstances, and given the typical fluidity of the Aboriginal
political domain, an organisation's mechanisms for internal accountability
have to balance the requirement to be accountable to its broader
constituency with the demand to be accountable and responsive to
particular locally-based interests. This in turn means that an organisation
has to give careful attention to the precise nature and extent of its
constituency, to the characteristics of its component groupings and the
contexts in which they emerge, and therefore to the contexts and forms in
which accountability to them must be maintained.
In other words, Aboriginal organisations which in the light of their
particular objectives have given careful attention to the actual nature, scope
and dynamics of their constituencies, and have attempted to incorporate
this diversity within their structures and processes, will be more likely to
have achieved internal accountability than those which attempt to
legitimate themselves whether internally or externally on some
unexamined notion of being 'community1 or 'grass roots' based.
Furthermore, this paper has suggested that organisations which have
developed structures and processes which maximise their internal
accountability are more likely to be externally accountable. Factors such as
broadly representative structures which incorporate the diversity of
constituencies, the incorporation of procedures for maximising
participation in decision-making and effective reporting mechanisms
including those derived from the Aboriginal domain, effective grievance
procedures, and appropriate contractual arrangements for staff, are more
likely to result in effective outcomes and in the accountable use of funds.
That is, organisations which have instituted processes to maximise internal
accountability will have incorporated the broad nature and diversity of
their constituencies into their structures, established participatory processes
by which organisational goals and strategies are developed, defined the
contexts in which the organisation will act, and established procedures for
ongoing monitoring of their performance by their constituencies. Such
matters relate directly to the achievement of what this discussion paper has
termed 'organisational self-determination' (the capacity for Indigenous
people to realise their goals through their own incorporated bodies) and
self-management (the capacity to effectively administer them). Thus, a
more rigorous approach to what internal accountability might entail, allows
it to be directly linked to the achievement of self-management and self-
determination.
This paper has argued that while there may be an inherent tension between
public accountability and self-determination, these policy goals are also
necessarily linked through the development of effective mechanisms for
internal accountability. In terms of policy development then, this argument
would suggest that the current prominence being accorded to financial
accountability in Aboriginal organisations need not be at the cost of self-
determination; both can be promoted through developing more
sophisticated and effective mechanisms to assist these organisations
develop better internal accountability.
These areas are in fact under-theorised, despite the ethnographic and policy
literature available. Both Aboriginal organisations and policy makers need
to adopt a more critical and reflexive stance in relation to how
representativeness, accountability and self-determination are to be
conceptualised, and the organisational and structural mechanisms by which
they might be achieved. This discussion paper has attempted to provide
some principles by which this reconceptualisation can take place.
Certainly, one practical approach commonly adopted would be to provide
the kinds of training in management and administrative procedures which
increase formal administrative skills within organisations (Smith 1994,
1996b). Properly conducted, such training also facilitates the development
of organisational perspectives wider than the particulars of local family or
group dynamics. However, as discussed, organisational failures and
successes are not simply a function of the administrative skill levels of
their boards or staff.
Within the increasing resource constraints that it faces, ATSIC could
promote the development and adoption of simple, consistent accounting
processes (including using computers) which can be used by Indigenous
groups to produce reports which are useful and accessible to their members
and directors. It has already undertaken this very successfully on a trial
basis with larger Community Development Employment Projects
organisations. It could also give priority to the development of training
modules for the members and directors of Indigenous associations. More
broadly, ATSIC could prioritise the ongoing support of Indigenous
organisations through its regional offices. For example, it could expand
existing programs to skill members and directors of Indigenous
organisations, and it could have a more effective case officer system so
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that each organisation's progress is assessed and monitored on a continuing
basis, and thus any problems identified well before formal intervention is
needed. Both monitoring and mentoring of Indigenous organisations
should become core areas of ATSIC responsibility.
A second option discussed in this paper could be to build requirements for
more sophisticated internal accountability into organisations' constitutions,
and into legislation such as the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act
under which they are incorporated. This could establish frameworks which
provide an incentive and guidelines for organisations to develop
procedures and structures which maximise internal accountability. It could
also provide a set of clearly defined standards against which organisations'
accountability and performance could be assessed and statutory means for
redressing failures, both for constituents and regulatoryauthorities.
A third option could be for funding agencies such as ATSIC to ensure that
specific and defined requirements for internal accountability as well as
financial accountability were part of their funding and grant acquittal
procedures. Thus, a prerequisite for organisations receiving grants to
deliver services of some kind could be that they had in place appropriate
structures broadly representative of the constituency to which they
proposed delivering the service, mechanisms to ensure equity in access to
the services, and effective and participative decision-making and reporting
mechanisms.
Finally, it could be argued that given the current policy climate of
significant funding cuts to Indigenous organisations (including ATSIC), a
concentration on the internal operations of these bodies would be an
entirely gratuitous additional burden on their already stretched resources.
Such a view would be entirely understandable. However, it is clear that not
only government but also the recipients of services provided by Aboriginal
organisations are demanding more accountable and effective service
delivery, given the continuing demonstrable socioeconomic disadvantage
suffered by many Aboriginal people. This paper has argued that a more
creative approach to internal accountability by both policy makers and
Aboriginal organisations can result in real progress towards achieving self-
determination and more effective delivery of services, while at the same
time providing the public accountability which is increasingly being
demanded.
Notes
1. This paper focuses on the implications of certain aspects of specifically
Aboriginal political culture in achieving both accountability and self-
determination. It does not claim that the analysis is equally true for Torres Strait
Islander people and organisations. Thus, where the word 'Indigenous' is used in
the paper, it is in general policy contexts which can appropriately refer to both
peoples.
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2. Sanders (1993b) offers a useful account of the attempts to reconcile public
accountability and self-determination and self-management in the administrative
and legislative framework established for ATSIC.
3. While many other such Indigenous organisations are incorporated under
alternative State and Territory legislation, this paper concentrates its discussion
largely on the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976, since it provides a
useful vehicle for examining the relationship between 'organisational self-
determination' and accountability.
4. Merlan (1996: 170) writes of the different bases of claim and title to country in
the native tide process, and the role of 'social processes of their reproduction, the
modes of belonging (to country and to the imagined human collectivities)' and
how these spill over into 'socio-territorial identity'. Although her discussion
directly refers to relationships between groups and country, the issue of how
groups are constituted and from whence they derive their authority is of a similar
order whether the context is land, resource allocation or control of community
organisations. Levitus (1991) discusses how clan membership can be used to
define boundaries between those who are formally incorporated and those who
are excluded in the wider forum of legal corporations.
5. For example, Altman and Smith (1994) raise the question of what constitutes the
group being 'self-determining' in the context of disputation within a Northern
Territory royalty association over the control of mining royaltydistribution.
6. It should be noted at this point, however, that the Aboriginal Land Rights
(Northern Territory) Act 1976 does not establish the requirements for
accountability within the Aboriginal domain in an arena of major dispute
throughout the Northern Territory - that of the distribution of royalty equivalents
- which the informed consent provisions provide for development proposals.
7. Martin (1996b) provides an analysis of how 'broadly representative' could be
interpreted in an area of western Queensland characterised by the diverse and
complex composition of its Aboriginal residential populations.
8. There are, however, certain categories of organisation where it may be necessary
to restrict the category of membership, such as 'royalty associations' formed to
distribute royalty moneys paid under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern
Territory) Act 1976 for mining on Aboriginal lands, or those formed for purely
commercial purposes. While it is still essential to develop more sophisticated
mechanisms to make such bodies accountable to the membership, the
'constituency' and 'membership' categories may well be identical. In fact, chronic
disputation can arise precisely because membership categories are too broadly
defined (Altman and Smith 1994).
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